

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake  
Deputy to the DCI for Support

SUBJECT: HUMINT Compartmentation

1. Action Requested: That you review and comment on the attached draft of a HUMINT Compartmentation system, but that you not pursue implementation at this time, and that you endorse continuation of the CIA's Blue Border control procedures.

2. Background: You have expressed a desire to have a formal HUMINT Compartmentation procedure and asked the Security Committee to draft such a procedure for your consideration. It is attached.

In preparation of this procedure, the Security Committee Staff conducted a review of procedures used by the CIA, DIA, FBI and Department of State to control and protect their HUMINT reports.

STAT

Many of the HUMINT reports controlled by the DIA are of primary value to military elements and are not distributed outside of DoD. The FBI has only a limited number of HUMINT reports of interest outside the FBI in consideration of the total number of "informant" reports prepared or reviewed at Bureau Headquarters annually.

98/35

The CIA, DIA, FBI and Department of State employ the prescriptions of the new Executive Order 12065 on protection of classified material in the dissemination of the majority of their reports. Not all reports are distributed routinely among all agencies least they be swamped with undesired and, from their viewpoint of needs, useless material. Requirements of recipients are identified and reports are issued on the basis of declared need-to-know.

STAT Less than 1% of HUMINT reports are considered because of sensitivity of content or source, to merit extraordinary protection. In example, of the [ ] HUMINT reports issued by CIA in the first six months of 1978, only [ ] were disseminated in the Blue Border series.

STAT

STAT For extra sensitive HUMINT reports, departments and agencies primarily use the device of Bigot Listing, dissemination only to named recipients within agencies on the basis of declared need-to-know and utility. With the exception of CIA's DDO Blue Border Controls, formal procedures have not been mandated for these Bigot List controls. And even CIA's Blue Border standards are in large measure based on already existing practices in the Community.

3. Discussion: A review of the existing procedures leads to the opinion that the Community members have constructed a series of responsive tight and effective, although informal and dispirit Bigot List control systems for the protection of their extra sensitive HUMINT reports. In the course of the review, reluctance was noted on the part of departments and agencies to favorably consider institutionalizing their procedures. The CIA alone favored more formal controls and with your previous approval of their Blue Border system and its acceptance throughout the Community, they are satisfied with existing controls.

In consideration of the low volume of extra sensitive HUMINT reports and the limited readership, this Bigot Lost approach appears more appropriate and appears to offer sound security through an easier managed security control device than would the establishment of a large compartmentation system similar to the COMINT or TALENT-KEYHOLE systems.

Further, the Bigot List procedure affords a flexibility to both originator and receiving agency to direct sensitive reports only to those with a certified need-to-know. The larger systems do not offer such flexibility with correspondingly tight controls.

On the other hand, there are disadvantages to the use of these Bigot List procedures. The controls are not uniform throughout the Community. There is no present interpretation that they fall within the definition of Executive Order 12065 for Special Access Programs and thus are not subject to your review and approval for creation or continuance. And lastly, they present the potential for a proliferation of codewords as each department and agency seeks a unique means of identifying their own reports, e.g. CIA's Blue Border series.

4. Staff Position: We think that a comment submitted by General James L. Brown, ACSI, USAF, in response to your invitation for comments about [redacted] current review of compartmentation issues is representative of the Community position on a compartment for HUMINT. Your question was, "Is there a need for more formalized compartmentation in the HUMINT field?". General Brown's observation is:

STAT

"The current method of operation within the HUMINT field is flexible, responsive, and secure. I do not believe that formalizing a good and workable system would add to its utility or security. Recommend that HUMINT remain outside of the current formalized SCI systems."

The Security Committee Staff agrees with this position.

At the same time, the CIA would like to continue their Blue Border control procedures which have already been approved by you and have been put into practice in the Community by recipients of this material.

In satisfaction of your request, the Security Committee Staff has drafted, and attaches for your consideration, a set of procedures that are in compliance with the Executive Order 12065 on National Security Information and DCID 1/19, Uniform Handling Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence and which could be adopted to formalize compartmentation of HUMINT material throughout the Community. However, we do not advise implementation at this time.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. You not pursue implementation of a formal compartmentation program for extra sensitive HUMINT reports at this time.

b. You review and comment on the sufficiency of the attached draft HUMINT Compartmentation Control System and agree to retain it, modified as appropriate, as a standby procedure.

c. You endorse the continuation of CIA's Blue Border control procedures to protect extra sensitive HUMINT reports published by the CIA.

John F. Blake

Attachment

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date

SUBJECT: HUMINT Compartmentation

Distribution:

Orig - Return to OS  
1 - Adse  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DDA  
1 - D/Sec  
1 - OS Registry  
1 - SECOM Subject  
① - SECOM Chrono

STAT

SECOM/ [ ] (18 Sept 78)

ORIGINATOR:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

SECOM-D-374

18 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: DCI's Compartmentation System  
for HUMINT Reports

1. Action Requested: None; for your information only.

2. Background: Last April, the DDO found that its Blue Border extra sensitive HUMINT reports were not being carefully controlled by recipients. The DDO structured a series of procedures and obtained the DCI's approval to disseminate these procedures to recipients of Blue Border reports. A willingness to accept these control procedures was stipulated as a precondition of receiving, or continuing to receive DDO Blue Border materials. The Community had no problems with this mandate and all agreed, in writing, to follow the standards. When he approved release of these standards, the DCI penned a note to the effect that he wanted the Security Committee to seek a more permanent solution -- e.g. codeword for HUMINT.

A little confusion followed as to who would actually attempt to come up with a HUMINT compartment and you asked [REDACTED] and me to take a look at what could be done. The result was preparation of a memorandum to the Director, telling him in essence that we did not need compartmentation for HUMINT reports. This was the result of a small investigation within the CIA's DDO.

STAT

[redacted] and I did not feel comfortable with telling the boss that we were not going to do what he had directed. So I took another shot at it. I contacted DIA, FBI, State Department, and again, elements of the DDO. No one wanted to participate in or formalize their dissemination procedures into a massive control system such as COMINT or TK systems. They all believed that their Bigot List arrangement offered flexibility as well as managerial control within a solid security framework.

STAT

STAT

[redacted] The DIA HUMINT reports satisfy tactical military command needs. As [redacted] DIA Dissemination Officer said, "If we disseminated all these reports to all customers, they would be neck deep in what they would view as garbage." The FBI did not give me a figure, but said that the majority of their HUMINT reports are meant for internal consumption. They disseminate very few HUMINT items against a very specific readership list. They were most adamant against the idea of participating in a Community-wide CSI HUMINT procedure. The Department of State puts out more HUMINT reports than does the Bureau, but much less than DIA or CIA. They too feel no need for a formal SCI procedure but were not as strong in opposition as were other members of the Community.

In looking at these procedures that are actually used today, it is found that HUMINT reports are distributed against Bigot Lists to specific components of the department or agency and identified recipient of these reports. The CIA has the most structured dissemination procedures. They use what they call three levels of dissemination criteria. The level that provides broadest dissemination of Secret HUMINT reports is a general dissemination list to most community members. A tighter list of recipients, based on need-to-know, is their Proscribed and Limited series. Their third and most stringent procedure is their Blue Border system. These reports are made available only to named individuals. It is only the Blue Border system that is formalized to some extent and agreed to by the community.

DIA satisfies its internal needs against "requirement" statements from various command levels. They disseminate some reports in response to the Community's Key Intelligence Questions. The FBI delivers copies of their HUMINT reports outside of the Bureau based completely on named recipients within departments and agencies against a very tightly controlled need-to-know. Dissemination is, in fact, determined by the Bureau and they do not respond to any Community-wide formally stipulated "need" list.

There is one issue that must be addressed in connection with these bigot list controls. That has to do with the requirements in the new Executive Order that any special controls, either compartmentation controls or bigot list controls, must be declared and maintained in a central point and reviewed every 5 years. The DCI is specifically charged with reviewing the continued need for such controls and approving their continuation else they automatically terminate. Just getting a handle on all of these will be a fantastic job. The only "out" that I can see to preclude the necessity of compiling a list of all of these controls is to recognize that in essence, they are not extraordinary procedures and accept the fact that they are merely department and agency attempts to comply with the demands of the Executive Order for dissemination based on need-to-know. If we do that, then there is no requirement to compile such a list, submit it for review to the Head of the ICRC, or require the DCI to review and re-approve on a 5-year cycle. I believe that this would be a true interpretation of what is going on in the Community with the exception of CIA's Blue Border control procedures, and the exception in this case is based solely on the fact that CIA had distributed and mandated use of certain standards by the Community. No one else does this. They all follow the general guidance of the Executive Order for the protection of classified information.



ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000100050068-3

STAT  
STAT

The DCI has recently mentioned that he wanted [ ] to review the need for HUMINT compartment. I believe [ ] is being advised that current procedures offer sufficient security and is having recommended to him that he not propose a formal compartment.

In spite of Community objections to the idea, it would be well to proceed in accordance with the Director's desires. We should, in essence, prepare a HUMINT compartment. I would not go so far as to give it a name, but I would spell out the procedures to be followed, make them agree with DCID 1/19 and Executive Order 12065 and have them ready to go if the DCI so elects. We could then give the DCI a memorandum telling him that we have prepared the procedures; attached them for his review; point out how the Community feels and recommend that he not implement them at this time.

In case you agree with this approach, I have attached the necessary papers.

[ ]

STAT

Attachment

Distribution:

Orig - Adse

1 - OS Registry

1 - SECOM Subj

1 - SECOM Chrono

SECOM/[ ]efn(18 Sept 78)

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000100050068-3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: John F. Blake  
Deputy to the DCI for Support  
SUBJECT: HUMINT Compartmentation

1. Action Requested: That you review and comment on the attached draft of a HUMINT Compartmentation system, but that you not pursue implementation at this time, and that you endorse continuation of the CIA's Blue Border control procedures.

2. Background: You have expressed a desire to have a formal HUMINT Compartmentation procedure and asked the Security Committee to draft such a procedure for your consideration. It is attached.

In preparation of this procedure, the Security Committee Staff conducted a review of procedures used by the CIA, DIA, FBI and Department of State to control and protect their HUMINT reports.

STAT

Many of the HUMINT reports controlled by the DIA are of primary value to military elements and are not distributed outside of DoD. The FBI has only a limited number of HUMINT reports of interest outside the FBI in consideration of the total number of "informant" reports prepared or reviewed at Bureau Headquarters annually.

The CIA, DIA, FBI and Department of State employ the prescriptions of the new Executive Order 12065 on protection of classified material in the dissemination of the majority of their reports. Not all reports are distributed routinely among all agencies least they be swamped with undesired and, from their viewpoint of needs, useless material. Requirements of recipients are identified and reports are issued on the basis of declared need-to-know.

Less than 1% of HUMINT reports are considered because of sensitivity of content or source, to merit extraordinary protection. In example, of the [ ] HUMINT reports issued by CIA in the first six months of 1978, only [ ] were disseminated in the Blue Border series.

STAT

STAT

For extra sensitive HUMINT reports, departments and agencies primarily use the device of Bigot Listing, dissemination only to named recipients within agencies on the basis of declared need-to-know and utility. With the exception of CIA's DDO Blue Border Controls, formal procedures have not been mandated for these Bigot List controls. And even CIA's Blue Border standards are in large measure based on already existing practices in the Community.

3. Discussion: A review of the existing procedures leads to the opinion that the Community members have constructed a series of responsive tight and effective, although informal and dispirit Bigot List control systems for the protection of their extra sensitive HUMINT reports. In the course of the review, reluctance was noted on the part of departments and agencies to favorably consider institutionalizing their procedures. The CIA alone favored more formal controls and with your previous approval of their Blue Border system and its acceptance throughout the Community, they are satisfied with existing controls.

In consideration of the low volume of extra sensitive HUMINT reports and the limited readership, this Bigot List approach appears more appropriate and appears to offer sound security through an easier managed security control device than would the establishment of a large compartmentation system similar to the COMINT or TALENT-KEYHOLE systems.

Further, the Bigot List procedure affords a flexibility to both originator and receiving agency to direct sensitive reports only to those with a certified need-to-know. The larger systems do not offer such flexibility with correspondingly tight controls.

On the other hand, there are disadvantages to the use of these Bigot List procedures. The controls are not uniform throughout the Community. There is no present interpretation that they fall within the definition of Executive Order 12065 for Special Access Programs and thus are not subject to your review and approval for creation or continuance. And lastly, they present the potential for a proliferation of codewords as each department and agency seeks a unique means of identifying their own reports, e.g. CIA's Blue Border series.

4. Staff Position: We think that a comment submitted by General James L. Brown, ACSI, USAF, in response to your invitation for comments about [ ] current review of compartmentation issues is representative of the Community position on a compartment for HUMINT. Your question was, "Is there a need for more formalized compartmentation in the HUMINT field?". General Brown's observation is:

STAT

"The current method of operation within the HUMINT field is flexible, responsive, and secure. I do not believe that formalizing a good and workable system would add to its utility or security. Recommend that HUMINT remain outside of the current formalized SCI systems."

The Security Committee Staff agrees with this position.

At the same time, the CIA would like to continue their Blue Border control procedures which have already been approved by you and have been put into practice in the Community by recipients of this material.

In satisfaction of your request, the Security Committee Staff has drafted, and attaches for your consideration, a set of procedures that are in compliance with the Executive Order 12065 on National Security Information and DCID 1/19, Uniform Handling Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence and which could be adopted to formalize compartmentation of HUMINT material throughout the Community. However, we do not advise implementation at this time.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. You not pursue implementation of a formal compartmentation program for extra sensitive HUMINT reports at this time.

b. You review and comment on the sufficiency of the attached draft HUMINT Compartmentation Control System and agree to retain it, modified as appropriate, as a stand-by procedure.

c. You endorse the continuation of CIA's Blue Border control procedures to protect extra sensitive HUMINT reports published by the CIA.

John F. Blake

Attachment

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date

SUBJECT: HUMINT Compartmentation

Distribution:

Orig - Return to OS

1 - Adse

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

2 - DDA

1 - D/Sec

1 - OS Registry

1 - SECOM Subject

1 - SECOM Chrono

STAT

SECOM/ [ ] (18 Sept 78)

ORIGINATOR:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date